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I. INTRODUCTION
My remarks for tonight's Public Square forum focus on three
global implications of the Asian financial crisis that I consider most
important as we move into a new century. They relate to certain
legal aspects of banking, global economic integration, and financial
crisis management.
You will see that the word "crisis" appears twice in the title of
my presentation, and appropriately so. It has been a crisis for mil-
lions of people in Asia in terms of their household economies,
businesses, savings, education, health, and futures. President
Clinton, in his state of the union address in January, called it "the
most serious financial crisis in a half a century. A leading econo-
mist has referred to it as "something that has no parallel in human
history.' For millions of people, it has increased unemployment,
prices, and poverty, while cutting opportunities for education,
3health, and other social programs.
Why the Asian financial crisis arose, how it affects us all, and
what it means in the years ahead, are topics too big to cover fully in
this evening's forum. But we can at least scratch the surface. To
get us started in that effort, I will take a few minutes to recount
briefly the economic tragedy that struck Asia starting in mid-1997
and the immediate aftermath of that tragedy. I will then summa-
rize my views regarding its longer-term implications.
My thesis, in a nutshell, is this: the Asian financial crisis has re-
vealed some deep fault lines in our international economy, and for
years to come we shall look back on it as a turning point in eco-
nomic history. The crisis will have repercussions far into the new
century, especially in three areas. First, the Asian financial crisis
will bring an enhanced discipline in banking laws for much of the
world (especially in less developed countries), with a view to mak-
ing national financial systems stronger, more resilient, and better
able to withstand the rigors of international market forces.
Second, the Asian financial crisis throws a new light on global
economic integration, on at least two fronts: currency regimes and
trade regulation. By highlighting so dramatically how fragile a na-
1. Nicholas D. Kristof & Edward Wyatt, Who Went Under in the World's Sea of
Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1999, at Al.
2. Id.
3. See Ernesto Pernia & James C. Knowles, Assessing the Social Impact of the Fi-
nancial Crisis in Asia, 30 AsIAN DEv. BANK REv., No. 4 1998, at 20, 20-21.
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tional currency can be, the Asian financial crisis will trigger a new
search for better currency exchange arrangements in the world.
Further, by highlighting the susceptibility of a national economy to
global economic forces, the Asian financial crisis will undercut
support for the kind of trade liberalization that has prevailed for
half a century and that now prompts the U.S. and European gov-
ernments to press for a new Millennium Round of trade and in-
vestment negotiations.
Third, I believe the Asian financial crisis marks a turning point
in global economic crisis management-that is, the mechanisms we
have, or should have, for dealing with the threat of national or re-
gional economic collapse. Which way we will turn on that issue of
global economic crisis management is now up in the air and needs,
in my view, a careful, intelligent, and imaginative debate.
II. THE CRISIS IN AsIA-MID-1997 TO MID-1998 4
The Asian economic crisis that struck in 1997 supports the old
adage that bad things come in threes. The crisis surfaced first in
Thailand in July 1997, moved to Indonesia beginning in October
1997, and hit Korea in late November of that year. In each case,
the International Monetary Fund ("IMF") reacted with a bailout
package involving its own funds and pledges from various countries
to provide backup financing. I shall quickly describe what hap-
pened in those three countries.
A. Thailand-Boom, Bust, and Bailout
Thailand had a boom economy in the 1980s, but from 1993
onward, Thailand's economic progress of the previous decade
started to unravel, with external debt reaching fifty percent of gross
domestic product ("GDP")-and forty percent of that debt was
4. The description of the Asian financial crisis offered in the following para-
graphs draws heavily from John W. Head, Lessons from the Asian Financial Crisis: The
Role of the IMF and the United States, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 70, 71-74 (1998). Cita-
tions to authority and related reading appear there. The Asian financial crisis has
been described in many other articles as well. For a useful overview and analysis,
see the four-part series of articles appearing in the New York Timws: Kristof & Wyatt,
supra note 1; Nicholas D Kristof & David E. Sanger, How U.S. Wooed Asia to Let Cash
Flow In, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16,1999, at Al; Nicholas D. Kristof & Sheryl WuDunn, Of
World Markets, None an Island, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1999, at Al; Nicholas D. Kristof,
World Ills Are Obvious, the Cures Much Less So, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1999, at Al.
1999]
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short-term.5 Most ominous, in my view, were the weaknesses that
started appearing in the financial system, especially in banks and
finance companies. These institutions borrowed heavily in dollars
and used those resources to pump money into the economy, creat-
ing a bubble. The bubble burst, and the weaknesses in the finan-
cial system became obvious to lenders and investors in the first half
of 1997. Confidence in Thailand's currency, the baht, dropped
quickly, forcing the government in July 1997 to abandon its at-
tempts to keep the value of the baht "pegged" to the U.S. dollar.6
The value of the baht fell sharply, as did values on Thailand's stock
market.7
In August 1997, the IMF arranged a financial bailout package
totaling about $17 billion.8 That package included $4 billion from
the IMF itself, $1.5 billion from the World Bank, $4 billion from
Japan, and a few billion from other countries and institutions.9
The bailout money was not, of course, given freely to Thailand
merely out of a sense of neighborliness. The money was pledged in
large part to prevent Thailand's crisis from spreading to other
countries, and the money had strings attached. Specifically, the
government of Thailand had to accept IMF prescriptions on several
economic and financial goals, such as increasing taxes, cutting gov-
ernment expenditures, and-most important in my view-suspend-
ing or restructuring non-viable financial institutions and imple-
menting other reforms in the financial sector.'O
B. Indonesia-Scrutiny, Disaster, and More IMF Funding
I will say more in just a moment about those reforms. First, let
me pick up the story with how Thailand's troubles spread to Indo-
nesia. The steep depreciation of the Thai baht naturally posed
threats to Thailand's trade competitors, as Thai exports became
cheaper to buy in terms of other currencies." This led to declines
5. See International Monetary Fund, IMF Approves Stand-by Credit for Thailand
(Aug. 20, 1997) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/pr9737.htm>.
6. See id. (stating that on July 2, 1997, "authorities introduced a managed
float of the baht, which subsequently depreciated about 20 percent against the
U.S. dollar duringJuly").
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id. (providing further details of the Thailand bailout package).
10. See id.
11. See W. Christopher Walker, Contagion: How the Asian Crisis Spread, 30 ASIAN
DEv. BANK REV., No. 4 1998, at 10, 11.
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in the values of some of the currencies in other Asian countries,
which in turn made it more expensive for borrowers in those coun-
tries to service their debts, many of which were short-term, foreign
currency debts." Also, more generally, problems in the Thai econ-
omy prompted investors to scrutinize other Asian economies more
closely, to see if they showed similar problems."
This added scrutiny illuminated serious weaknesses in Indone-
sia's economy, including, in particular, its banking sector. Indone-
sian banks, like those in Thailand, had borrowed heavily from
abroad, and had also made loans to domestic companies that were
heavily exposed to similar foreign borrowings. 14 As the Indonesian
rupiah fell in value in the weeks following the Thailand disaster, it
became more likely that Indonesian borrowers would default on
their short-term foreign borrowings. In short, the Indonesian
banking system was threatened with collapse.
Once again the IMF stepped in. In early November, the IMF
arranged a bailout package totaling $40 billion. 15 The $40 billion
for Indonesia came from about the same places as the money for
Thailand had come from-$10 billion from the IMF, $3 or $4 bil-
lion each from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank,
. 16$5 billion from Japan, and several billion from other countries.
Like the bailout package for Thailand, the one for Indonesia
had strings attached. Indonesia's government was required to
adopt several economic austerity measures, to restructure its finan-
cial sector, and to open its economy to foreign trade and invest-
ment.17 Indonesia could get access to the money in the IMF bailout
package only if it took certain prescribed steps to achieve these
goals.
Let me pause here to take a short detour. I'll come back to
talk about Korea in just a minute. But first, what kind of an animal
is this IMF bailout package? What is in the package? First of all, it
is a package of loans. These bailouts are not grants. The center-
piece of the bailout package is a loan from the IMF. The IMF usu-
ally does not call it a loan, but instead refers to its financing as a
12. See id. at 11-12.
13. See id.
14. See International Monetary Fund, IMF Approves Stand-by Credit for Indonesia
(Nov. 5, 1997) http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/PR9750. htm>.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
1999]
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"stand-by arrangement."8  For our purposes, though, it is close
enough to a loan to call it a loan. Typically, an IMF loan has to be
repaid about three to five years after it is disbursed.'9 In the mean-
time, the loan carries interest on it, and the interest rate is tied to
market rates. The interest rate on these IMF loans for last year was
a little under five percent, or, in special cases, around eight per-
cent.2' There are some types of IMF loans that do not carry interest
and that have longer maturities,22 but these were not the type of
loans that Thailand and Indonesia received as part of their bailout
packages.
What are the chances of these loans being repaid? Judging
from the past, the chances are pretty good. For its 1997-98 fiscal
year, the IMF reported total credit outstanding to its member coun-
tries of about $65 billion.3 It reported a total amount of overdue
obligations-unpaid loans-of about $3 billion. 4 That works out
to a default rate of less than five percent. Put differently, the IMF
has a loan repayment rate of over ninety-five percent. I imagine
there are a lot of commercial banks that would enjoy having loan
18. For an account of IMF financing through "stand-by arrangements" and
other means, see John W. Head, Suspension of Debtor Countries' Voting Rights in the
IMF An Assessment of the Third Amendment to the IMF Charter, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 591,
594-95 (1993). For a general description of IMF financing and other aspects of
IMF operations, see the articles contained in 27 IMF SURv. Supp. 1 (1998).
19. See IMF Financing Helps Members Pursue Sound Policies, 27 IMF SuRv. Supp.
16, 16 (1998). The IMF loan to Korea required repayment beginning after one
year. See Michel Camdessus, Economic and Financial Situation in Asia: Latest Develop-
ments (Jan. 16, 1999) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/ 1999/011699.
htm>. It was the first loan made under the Supplemental Reserve Facility estab-
lished by the IMF in December 1997. See id.; see also IMFFinancing, supra, at 17
(discussing the Supplemental Reserve Facility as a "new lending window" and stat-
ing that it was first activated when it loaned money to Korea).
20. See IMF Sets Annual Net Income Target to Add to Reserves, 27 IMF SuRv. SuTPP.
27, 27 (1998) (showing the average rate of charge as 4.65% for regular borrow-
ing).
21. See IMFFinancing, supra note 19, at 17 (noting the "surcharge of 300 basis
points" applicable to loans from the Supplemental Reserve Facility).
22. See id. at 17-18 (referring to the IMF's Extended Fund Facility and various
concessional facilities).
23. See id. at 16 (showing credit outstanding at about SDR 50 billion). The
SDR, or Special Drawing Right, is a special reserve asset created by the IMF. Its
value is based on a "basket" of five strong currencies-the U.S. dollar, the Japanese
yen, the Deutsche mark, the Pound sterling, and the French franc-and it is cur-
rently worth about $1.30. See SDR Supplements Existing Reserves, 27 IMF SuRv. Supp.
26, 26 (1998). The IMF's fiscal year runs from May 1 through April 30. See IMF
Financing, supra note 19, at 16 n.1.
24. See IMF Strategy Stresses Prevention, Cooperation, 27 IMF SuRv. Supp. 28, 28
(1998) (showing overdue obligations for 1997-98 of about SDR 2.3 billion).
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repayment rates that high. Why do countries pay back their IMF
loans so religiously? Because IMF loans are very high-profile loans.
If a country fails to pay one back, or to pay interest on one, its
chances of getting financing from any other sources go way down. 5
Let me make one more point about the IMF loans, and then I
will end this detour and return to the story of the Asian financial
crisis. In making a loan, the IMF does not hand over all the money
to the government at once. Instead, the loan is made available in
several disbursements, with all disbursements after the first one be-
26ing conditional on the government's performance. Specific eco-
nomic targets are set in some areas, such as targets for reducing the
country's inflation through a squeeze on the money supply, or re-
ducing the country's budget deficit by cutting the number of em-
ployees on the government's payroll. In other areas, of course, the
conditions take on a different character-for example, whether the
country has enacted legislation to reform its system of banking su-
pervision. If a government fails to meet any of these conditions-
the quantifiable ones or the non-quantifiable ones-the IMF will
27typically refuse to release the next disbursement under the loan.
This has happened many times in many countries, including Indo-
nesia and Russia in recent years.'8
C. Korea-the Biggest Tiger Falls
I'll have more to say about the IMF later on. But now let me
pick up again with the story of the Asian financial crisis as it un-
folded in the latter half of 1997. On the heels of disaster in Indo-
nesia came the biggest news of all. Korea, one of the Asian "tigers,"
25. Many commercial and official creditors condition the disbursement of
funds under a loan agreement with a developing country on approval of a loan
from the IMF, or on the continued effectiveness of such a loan. See Head, supra
note 18, at 594 n.5.
26. For explanations of the "conditionality" that applies to IMF lending, see
Fostering Sustained Policy Implementation, 27 IMF SuRv. SuPP. 14, 14-15 (1998). See
also John W. Head, Environmental Conditionality in the Operations of International De-
velopment Finance Institutions, 1 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 15, 21-22 (1991).
27. See Head, supra note 26, at 21.
28. See, e.g., Indonesia Reform Program Not Yielding Results: Suharto, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2240407 (stating that the IMF
withheld Indonesia's second disbursement of its funds as it had refused to enact
many of the reforms it promised it would); World Bank Takes Itself to Task for Indone-
sia Lapses, CHIcAGO TPIB., Feb. 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2843489 ("The IMF
has periodically withheld small amounts of money from Russia and other nations
that have refused to live up to their financial agreements.... .").
1999]
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saw its economy stumble and fall.
29
In recent decades, the Korean economy had grown rapidly. Its
per capita GDP in recent years had risen on average nearly seven
percent a year, turning a poor agrarian economy into the eleventh
biggest economy in the world•. However, Korea's economy had
problems-in particular, an inefficient financial sector, where
banks lacked a commercial orientation.3' They made risky loans to
companies that, as in Thailand and Indonesia, had incurred a lot of
short-term foreign debt. Many of these companies went into bank-
ruptcy starting in early 1997, both because of over-investment in
some sectors of the economy (such as real estate) and because of a
general cyclical downturn.3' Those company bankruptcies resulted,
of course, in a big increase in banks' non-performing loans. Ko-
rea's financial system was soon on the ropes.
Faced with the risk of total economic collapse, the Korean
government accepted an IMF bailout package in early December
1997, amounting to $57 billion-the size of the Thailand and In-
33donesia packages combined. Of that $57 billion, $21 billion came
from the IMF. It was the largest loan ever made by the IMF. As
with the bailout packages for Thailand and Indonesia, the financ-
ing for Korea had strings attached-economic and financial policy
prescriptions, and a requirement that Korea restructure its finan-
35cial sector.
III. THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH-RECOVERY, DESPAIR, CONTAGION
I have just given a thumbnail sketch of how the Asian financial
crisis erupted and how the international community reacted. Let
me turn now to the immediate aftermath of the crisis.
29. For an account of how the Asian financial crisis spread to Korea, see
Head, supra note 4, at 73-74.
30. See International Monetary Fund, IMF Approves SDR 15.5 Billion Stand-by
Credit for Korea (Dec. 4, 1997) <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/1997/
pr9755.htm>.
31. See id.
32. See id.
33. See id.; see also supra notes 11 and 18 and accompanying text.
34. See id.
35. See id. (providing the details of the Korea bailout package).
[Vol. 25
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A. Thailand and Korea Recover
By the middle of 1998, Thailand and Korea had largely moved
out of the crisis stage and into the recovery stage. Since that time,
both the Thai baht and the Korean won have strengthened and
36stabilized, and their stock markets have risen substantially from a
37
year ago.
In short, I think we can be confident that although Thailand
and Korea were seriously injured by the financial crisis, they will
rebuild and recover. The long-term effects of the economic crisis
in those countries are profoundly troubling, especially at the level
of individual citizens and families, but at least the short-term crisis
for those countries' economies has largely passed .
B. Indonesia's Despair
Indonesia is a different story. The financial crisis there com-
bined with bigger economic and political factors: a dictator in
power for over thirty years; a form of "crony capitalism" that con-
centrated much of the country's wealth in that man and his family;
a strong undercurrent of resentment and resistance nurtured by
years of repression; and an awkward agglomeration of islands, dia-
lects, and cultures, sprawling across four time zones.9 As you know,
President Suharto was forced to step down in mid-1998, and his
successor, President Habibie, has struggled to steer the country
away from political and economic chaos ever since. 4° The last nine
36. See, e.g., The Darkest Hour Comes Just Before Dawn, ECONOMIST, Oct. 17, 1998,
at 85, 85 (noting that the baht had risen to a seven-month high against the dollar);
IMF Approves $500M Credit Boost for Thailand, NATION, Dec. 18, 1998, available in
1998 WL 21410419 (quoting the IMF's Managing Director as saying that Thai-
land's "exchange rate has strengthened and stabili[z]ed").
37. See Kristof, supra note 4, at Al. In another tenuous sign of economy re-
covery, Korea's imports rose inJanuary 1999, the first such rebound in 16 months.
See James Lim, South Korea Imports Up 15.4 Percent in January, First Rebound in 16
Months, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 229, 229-30 (1999).
38. In a vote of optimism, Economist asserted several months ago that East Asia
"offers the first glimmer of hope," and that "there are grounds for being cautiously
optimistic: the bottom of the market may have been passed." Darkest Hour, supra
note 36, at 85.
39. See, e.g., Indonesia: Teetering, Bus. AsIA, Apr. 19, 1999, available in 1999 WL
10768566 (describing many of the current and past problems facing Indonesia).
40. See Suharto Does Not Believe in Democracy: Electoral Commission Official,
1999]
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months have seen student riots in many major cities, ethnic attacks
against Chinese, Christians burning mosques, Muslims burning
churches, a breakdown in military discipline, food riots, and even
starvation.4'
The picture in Indonesia is not entirely negative-the rupiah
has now recovered to a value of 9,000 to the dollar, compared with
over 16,000 to the dollar in June 199841-but any such progress is
necessarily fragile and tentative. The social, political, and eco-
nomic infrastructure of Indonesia has been badly damaged, like a
building torn apart by a terrible storm. It will not be rebuilt soon,
if ever.
Let me take that image of a terrible storm and build it into a
metaphor that I think captures the significance of the Asian finan-
cial crisis. Let's assume that I team up with Professor Downs (the
William Mitchell faculty member who invited me to speak tonight)
to open a travel agency specializing in South Pacific vacation pack-
ages. He and I travel to Fiji, Tonga and Vanuatu, and we encour-
age local residents there to build tourist hotels along the beaches in
those South Pacific countries. "You build the beach resorts," we tell
them, "and we will send tourists your way." It is a great idea: the
tourists will be happy spending time and money at the beach re-
sorts, the local residents will be happy earning the money the tour-
ists spend, and Professor Downs and I will be happy with the fees
and commissions we receive. In short order, a big beach resort is
built in each of those three island countries, and a modest flow of
tourists go there in the first year or two. Everybody is happy. The
beach resorts are, to tell the truth, a little rickety, a little dirty, a lit-
tle amateurish, but that is all part of their appeal.
After about five years, Professor Downs and I have seen our
business grow like topsy. The beach resorts are always filled to ca-
pacity, and more resorts are being built not only on Fiji, Tonga,
and Vanuatu, but now also in Samoa, the Solomon Islands, and
other South Pacific island countries. Professor Downs and I think
this is great.
There is, however, a problem: typhoons. Typhoons are getting
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Apr. 15, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2583998 (stating
Suharto was ousted in May 1998, and replaced as President of Indonesia by
Habibie).
41. See Kristof, supra note 4, at Al; A Dum-Dum Too Many, ECONOMIST, Nov. 28,
1998, at 42, 42; Mark Landler, Grim Assessment by U.N. of Economic Slide in Asia, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at A18.
42. See Kristof, supra note 4, at Al.
[Vol. 25
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more frequent and more forceful in the South Pacific. Nobody
knows whether to blame El Nifio or global warming, but every year
brings more typhoons. Unfortunately, the beach resorts are not
built to be very sturdy. Professor Downs and I had never really
looked too closely at their construction or their overall safety, al-
though we did tell the owners to make sure the beach resorts were
relatively safe. It turns out that they aren't strong enough to with-
stand anything more than a normal storm.
Then, one dark day in Paradise a terrible "signal III" ty-
phoon-a real whopper-sweeps across the South Pacific, hitting
several of the island countries and their beach resorts. Gale-force
winds and punishing tidal waves leave some of the resorts in ruins,
killing dozens of tourists and hundreds of local staff workers.
Professor Downs and I are distraught, and we decide to take
action immediately. Even while the typhoons are still raging, we
organize relief efforts where the storms have already brought death
and destruction, and we help arrange financing to rebuild the
beach resorts already damaged and to strengthen the foundations
and walls and roofs of the resorts that the typhoons still threaten to
strike.
Why are Professor Downs and I involved? For a mix of rea-
sons: we encouraged the building of the beach resorts in the first
place, we sent the tourists there, and we have already booked more
tourists to go there in coming months. We have built a business
that depends on the beach resorts.
In this metaphor, the South Pacific island countries represent
the less economically developed countries around the world. The
beach resorts represent their legal and financial systems, welcom-
ing foreign investors. The tourists are those foreign investors. The
typhoons represent the massive flow of funds and information and
confidence that characterize today's global financial markets. And
of course Professor Downs and I represent the IMF and the major
industrial economies that have urged all countries, including espe-
cially developing countries, to adopt liberal trade and investment
policies.
C. Contagion:Japan, Brazil, and Beyond
The Asian financial crisis is still with us. It is now in the longer-
term "contagion" stage. Having moved from Thailand to Indonesia
to Korea in the second half of 1997, it then started eating at Japan.
That country is now suffering through its biggest recession since
19991
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World War II, and its economic policies and institutions-and es-
pecially its banking system-have been scrutinized and found defi-
41cient in many respects.
This contagion effect has not been confined to Asia. Most re-
cently, Brazil has been in the news because of its financial crisis.4
Indeed, the Asian crisis has prompted investors to scrutinize many
less developed countries-the so-called "emerging markets"-and
to move away from the risks that those countries now appear to
have. In Brazil's case, investor confidence dropped, the currency
dropped, the economy faced disaster, and the IMF once again
stepped in with a bailout package.
This "contagion" problem can also be illustrated by my ty-
phoon metaphor. Even after the first wave of typhoons has passed,
tourists (that is, investors) are wary of all beach resorts (that is,
emerging markets). And the trouble might continue to spread.
According to a recent World Bank report, there is still a danger of
world recession as an after-effect of the Asian financial crisis. Al-
though the United States economy is still strong, it is by no means
immune to the Asian contagion. In Kansas, the overall merchan-
dise exports to Asia have dropped substantially in the past year or46
so. And the overall U.S. trade deficit with Asia for 1998 rose to
about $160 million-the biggest annual regional trade deficit in
43. Among those calling for Japan to fix its banking system is the IMF's First
Deputy Managing Director, Stanley Fischer. See Stanley Fischer, Lessons from a Cri-
sis, ECONOMIST, Oct. 3, 1998, at 23, 27; see also Lessons from Argentina's 1995 Finan-
cial Crisis May Be Applicable to Other Countries, 28 IMF SURv. 8, 8-9 (1999) (discussing
"Japan's banking crisis" and noting the need "to restore solvency and lending ca-
pacity to the core banking system"). The United States has been sharply critical of
Japan's financial system and has insisted that Japan undertake extensive reforms.
See Mark Felsenthal & Toshio Aritake, Clinton Urges Japan to Act on Reforms; Cites
Slowdown of U.S., Asian Economies, 15 INT'L TRADE REP. 1366, 1366-67 (1998). Japan
began 1999 "with a record low of 3 percent negative economic growth from last
year, a record high unemployment rate of 4.4 percent, a record number of corpo-
rate failures .... a record high government deficit.... and the lowest tax revenues
in more than 20 years." Gary G. Yerkey et al., 1999 Outlook: International Trade, 16
INT'L TRADE REP. 103, 110 (1999).
44. See, e.g., Kristof & Wyatt, supra note 1, at Al (noting that "the Brazilian
crisis ... underscores that the storm has not necessarily passed").
45. See David E. Sanger, U.S. and I.M.F. Made Asia Crisis Worse, World Bank
Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 1998, at Al (quoting a report of the World Bank that
warns "there is still a substantial risk that the world economy will plunge into re-
cession in 1999").
46. SeeJohn W. Head, International Trade Law at the Close of the Century, J. KAN.
BARASs'N, Apr. 1999, at 26.
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the history of the world.47
I have quickly surveyed the Asian financial crisis and its imme-
diate repercussions, including some in our own hemisphere. Why
should we care? Why not just treat this crisis as an isolated tragic
incident and move on? Because I believe many things will be dif-
ferent now. The Asian financial crisis will have lasting implications
in at least three areas. I turn now to the first of those: banking law.
IV. ENHANCED DISCIPLINE IN BANKING LAW
For the last several years, I have spent some of my summers
and vacations as a legal consultant trying to help develop sound
banking systems in various countries that are in economic transi-
tion. I have worked most in Mongolia, but also in three of the for-
mer Soviet republics and in countries in Africa and the Middle
East. I suppose nothing I have said or written as part of those ef-
forts has been nearly as persuasive as the Asian financial crisis has
been in prompting government officials to strengthen their bank-
ing rules. Let me explain what I mean.
In my work overseas, I have been preaching a three-part ser-
mon about the legal framework for a national financial system.
The details of my three-part sermon are guaranteed to put most
people to sleep. You can see some of those details, if you wish, in
an article that I wrote last year.4' For present purposes, let me sim-
ply make the following assertions, as a stripped-down survey of
these three areas of enhanced discipline in banking law.
A. Central Bank Independence
9
It is widely thought today that a central bank-which in most
countries of the world is an entity owned by the government but set
up as a separate unit both administratively and financially--should
have price stability as its main goal. Why? Because inflation can
bring such damage to a country's economy. In order to achieve
that goal of price stability, it is widely thought that a central bank
must have a high degree of independence-that is, insulation from
short-term political pressures. Time and time again governments
have interfered with the efforts of central banks to carry out sound
47. SeeYerkey et al., supra note 43, at 111.
48. See Head, supra note 4.
49. For a more detailed discussion of central bank independence, see Head,
supra note 4, at 85-87.
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monetary policy because the government wanted to spur economic
activity or finance its own budget deficits by ordering the central
bank to print money.
In recent years, many countries have amended their central• 50
banking laws to provide for greater independence. The IMF has
strongly supported these revisions and it insisted that similar
changes be made in Korea's central banking law as part of its bail-51
out deal. The Asian financial crisis highlights the need for central
bank independence, and I think that is a good thing.
B. Imposing International Banking Standard
2
Likewise, I think it is a good thing that the Asian financial cri-
sis has highlighted the need for national banking systems to apply
international banking standards, to force commercial banks to be-
have prudently in their operations, so as to protect depositors and
thereby guard against the kind of crisis of confidence that can cre-
ate a banking panic. These well-tested international standards al-
ready exist-on capital adequacy, on insider lending, on connected
lending, on banking supervision, on accounting and auditing, and
so forth.53
Who cares about these rather dull issues of central bank inde-
pendence and international banking standards? I can tell you that
in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, a lot of central bank-
ers and government officials and commercial bankers are now talk-
ing about these principles of banking law, at least in the countries I
have been working in. Why? Because they know that what hap-
pened in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea can happen to them.
The sudden evaporation of confidence in a financial system, as oc-
50. See IMF/MONETARY& & EXCHANGE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, ELEMENTS OF
CENTRAL BANK AUTONOMY AIND ACCOUNTABILiTY (IMF/MAE Operational Paper),
Feb. 1998, at 34-36. For a discussion of some criticisms of central bank independ-
ence, and the likelihood that those criticisms will gain popular support in coming
years, see The Central Banker as God, ECONOMIsT, Nov. 14, 1998, at 23, 24-26.
51. See International Monetary Fund, supra note 30.
52. For a more detailed discussion of international banking standards, see
Head, supra note 4, at 80-85.
53. For key guidelines on banking supervision and some of the other stan-
dards mentioned here, see Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, Core Princi-
ples for Effective Banking Supervision (Sept. 1997), available at
<http://www.bis.org/publ/index.htm>. The Basle Committee on Banking Super-
vision is a committee of banking supervisory authorities established in 1975 that
consists of representatives from several economically developed countries. See
Head, supra note 4, at 95, n.83.
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curred in those countries, can occur anywhere.
And because it can happen anywhere, I think the coming years
will bring an increasing discipline in national financial systems
around the world. This is a silver lining to the dark cloud of the
Asian financial crisis.
C. "Exit Policy "-Dealing with Insolvent Banks
54
I want to cover one more base on the subject of banking law:
"exit policies." When a country's banks do not follow prudential
standards in their operations, they can become insolvent. How
should insolvent banks be handled? In most cases, they should be
closed and restructured-or, if necessary, liquidated-under rules
that protect depositors first and foremost. This is best for the de-
positors in that bank, of course, and best for the financial system as
a whole because it gives depositors in other banks confidence that
they will be protected. This is especially important in countries
that do not have any effective form of deposit insurance.
However, in some countries where I have worked, insolvent
banks are allowed to stay open, letting incompetent or dishonest
managers and owners continue to bleed them dry of all the deposi-
tors' money. Why? Because of cozy relations between the owners,
the borrowers, and the regulators. In the wake of the Asian finan-
cial crisis, countries are being forced to recognize the importance
of having tough, efficient procedures for ushering insolvent banks
out of the financial system-in other words, for imposing an "exit
policy."
Overall, then, I believe the Asian financial crisis marks a turn-
ing point in banking law and discipline. It has demonstrated the
pitfalls of allowing fast-and-loose banking practices to continue.
Leaders in business, government, and finance recognize the need
for stronger banking systems, not just in Thailand, Indonesia, and
Korea, but in all countries.55
54. For a more detailed discussion of "exit policy" rules, see Head, supra note
4, at 75-78.
55. A September 1998 meeting of leading lawyers from across Asia empha-
sized the need to undertake reforms in the regulation of banks and other financial
institutions. See A Meeting at the Bank's Manila Headquarters Identified Three Areas of
Concern, Says Nigel Page, FIN. TIMES (LONDON), Dec. 22, 1998, at 14. For a summary
of the IMF's view on "financial sector soundness," see Camdessus Stresses Sound
Banking System Requires Strong and Transparent Framework, 27 IMF SURv. 375, 375
(1998).
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Let me put this in the context of my metaphor about beach re-
sorts and typhoons: because the typhoon (that is, the Asian finan-
cial crisis) was so severe, the owners of beach resorts all over the
world (that is, national governments) recognize the need to make
the buildings at their resorts (that is, their banking systems) strong
enough to withstand the increasing violence of the storms coming
their way.
V. A CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
A second implication of the Asian financial crisis that I wish to
mention concerns global economic integration. For the last fifty
years or so, the world has seen a dramatic change in the level of
economic interaction among countries-international commerce
has grown exponentially, corporations have global operations, fi-
nancial transactions take place all over the world around the clock.
Along with this crescendo of business activity has come an expand-
ing set of legal and regulatory regimes that are global in charac-56
ter. I wish to talk briefly about two of them. One concerns na-
tional currencies and the other concerns international trade.
A. A New World of Currencies
Let me offer first a quick history lesson that applies both to• 57
currencies and to trade. At the close of World War II, leading
economists and politicians in the Allied countries, especially the
United States and Great Britain, identified three problem areas
that needed solutions if a third world war was to be avoided. The
first involved currencies. In the inter-war years, countries had en-
gaged in competitive devaluations of their currencies, in order to
boost their own exports and restrict imports. The second problem
area involved trade. In the inter-war years, countries had engaged
in competitive increases in tariff levels, again to keep out foreign
56. For a discussion of the growth of multilateral sets of rules and interna-
tional organizations to implement them, see John W. Head, Supranational Law:
How the Move Toward Multilateral Solutions is Changing the Character of "International"
Law, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 605 (1994).
57. For more complete descriptions of the historical background of the IMF,
the World Bank, and the GATT regime, see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN A DIVIDED WORLD 325-26 (1986); RicHARD W. EDWARDS, JR., INTERNATIONAL
MONETARY COLLABORATION 4-5 (1985); and John W. Head, Making International
Trade Less Foreign: A "Nutshell -for Nonspecialists on the Changing Rules Governing In-
ternational Trade, J. KAN. BAR AsS'N, Dec. 1992, at 42, 43-44.
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imports and thereby protect their own industries. The third prob-
lem area was reconstruction of Europe, which lay in ruins at the
close of the war.
For these three problem areas, three new international organi-
zations, with countries as members, were envisioned: the IMF, to
handle currency matters; the International Trade Organization, to
handle trade matters; and the World Bank, to handle the recon-
struction of Europe and economic development elsewhere. The
first and third of these institutions-the IMF and the World Bank-
were created at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in the summer of
1944. The International Trade Organization was not created,
largely because of emerging Cold War tensions, but the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATF") gradually took on the
role of global trade liberalization.
Just how was the IMF to deal with the problem of competitive
devaluations of currencies? By managing a newly established par
value system, under which the exchange rate between the dollar
and the pound and the franc and so forth would all be fixed, so
that buyers and sellers in different countries could trade without
much concern about currency matters. This would, in turn, in-
crease international trade, which was seen as a good thing. From
the perspective of international traders, the par value system would
not be as satisfactory perhaps as having just one global currency,
but it went a long way toward realizing-what has been referred to as
mankind's "dream of monetary unity. " 8
That par value system lasted a quarter of a century, until it
crumbled in the early 1970s.59 You might see this as a battle: the
dream of global monetary unity versus the reality of national sover-
eignty. And national sovereignty won.
How does this relate to the Asian financial crisis? That crisis
has highlighted the fragility of national currencies and has opened
up the same old debate about currencies. It is a debate between
global solutions and national solutions. On the one hand, there
58. At a July 1994 meeting marking the fiftieth anniversary of the Bretton
Woods conference, which created the IMF and the World Bank, a former IMF
managing director made a remark about "the dream of monetary unity" of all
mankind. Jacques de Larosi6re, Remarks Prepared for Delivery at the Bretton
Woods Commission Plenary Session, Washington, D.C. (July 21, 1994) (on file
with author). For press accounts of the conference, see Rich Miller, Policymakers
Ponder How to Tame Dollar, Spur Growth, REUTERS WORLD SERV., July 21, 1994.
59. For a detailed account of the breakdown of the par value system, see
EDWARDS, supra note 57, at 491-501.
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have been proposals recently for a regime something like the old
par value system, involving the yen, the dollar, and the euro. Presi-
dent Jacque Chirac of France in February urged that the United
States, Japan, and Europe cooperate to manage the exchange rates
of their currencies, keeping them within specific target zones; and
Germany and Japan have showed some support for that proposal. 6
Of course, such a regime would not have been possible even a year
ago, before the introduction of the euro. With that new cur-
rency-which promises, by the way, to challenge the position of the
U.S. dollar as the principal currency of world trade and invest-
ment 1-I predict we will see more proposals along these lines, al-
though the United States has rejected them so far. 2 Even the top
American official at the IMF has predicted that if the euro suc-
ceeds, "there probably will be a shift toward ... more currency un-
ions and fewer currencies. 6 ' As possible evidence of a move in this
direction, Argentina has been considering whether to discard its
national currency, the peso, and just use U.S. dollars instead.6
There is, however, an important counter-trend. In the tug-of-
war between international economic integration versus national
sovereignty, some countries are considering new rules--especially
controls on capital movements-that would protect their national
currencies against sudden attack. Some of these moves pre-date
the Asian financial crisis, but the crisis has brought new urgency to
the question of currencies. Some countries like the approach sug-
gested by Chile a few years ago to tax short-term capital in-flows, to
protect against the chaos of quick capital flight. Malaysia, for ex-
ample, imposed limits on capital movements in September of last
year, and some commentators see that policy as having worked, at
65least in the short run. Perhaps such controls can be analogized to
60. See David E. Sanger, Chirac, in U.S., Offers Alternative Approach to Economic
Crises, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1999, atA5.
61. See, e.g., C. Fred Bergsten, America and Europe: Clash of the Titans , FOREIGN
Arr., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 20, 20 (noting that "[t] he euro is likely to challenge the
international financial dominance of the [U.S.] dollar").
62. See Sanger, supra note 60, at A5.
63. Passing the Buck: Argentina Considers a Radical Peso Defense: Use Dollars In-
stead, WALL ST. J.,Jan. 18, 1999, at Al.
64. See id.
65. See Kristof, supra note 4, at Al. Last summer a prominent economist usu-
ally favoring economic liberalization indicated support for some forms of currency
controls. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in
Widgets and Dollars, FOREIGN Arr., May-June 1998, at 7, 12. Similar views appear in
an Asian Development Bank publication. See ABD Economic Analysis & Research
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the safety airbags in automobiles. They are effective if they are put
in place for a very short time, to guard against disaster, but then
they must be removed immediately afterward to avoid another dis-
aster.
In short, we enter the new century full of uncertainties about
national currencies and about what form of international integra-
tion, if any, there should be in this area. For many years, the west-
ern countries have been pressing for more and more liberalization
and now many developing countries are starting to resist that liber-
alization in the area of currencies-and much more emphatically
in the aftermath of the Asian crisis.
B. Who Wants the Millennium Round?
I believe the same kind of uncertainty exists in the area of in-
ternational trade and investment. Recall my brief history lesson of
a few minutes ago. The ITO was to be established in the 1940s, as a
complementary institution to the IMF and the World Bank, but the
ITO was not created and instead the GATT carried the load of
trade liberalization for about forty-five years. Then, with the Uru-
guay Round of trade negotiations, the Americans and other indus-
trialized governments pressed for bold new initiatives to liberalize
not only trade in goods but also trade in services, trade in agricul-
tural products, and investment. From the Uruguay Round
emerged the World Trade Organization ("WTO") as a new interna-
tional organization to facilitate the liberalization and economic in-
tegration promised in a score of new agreements. This amounts to
a stunning victory for free trade, foreign investment, and globaliza-
tion.
Now, building on that victory, the United States and other in-
dustrialized countries have proposed a new Millennium Round of
trade negotiations. But there is much concern over this, espe-
cially given the experiences flowing from the Asian financial crisis.
Several developing countries are resisting any further liberalization
Division et al., Exchange Controls: The Path to Economic Recovery in Asia ?, 30 AsIAN
DEv. BANK REv., No. 4 1998, at 14; see also Robert Wade & Frank Veneroso, The
Gathering Support for Capital Controls?, CHALLENGE, Nov. 1, 1998, available in 1998
WL 15400060.
66. For a synopsis of the background to the Millennium Round and issues it
will address, see Yerkey et al., supra note 43, at 103-05. President Clinton endorsed
the new round of negotiations in his January 1999 State-of-the-Union address. See
id. at 103.
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of trade and investment, and indeed there are signs of resistance
68also within this country.
I am not ready to offer a prediction about how this debate will
come out. But I do predict that the debate-over whether to open
a new round of global trade negotiations and, if so, over what fur-
ther liberalizing steps countries should take toward foreign invest-
ment in particular-will be much more heated than ever before,
largely because of the Asian financial crisis.
VI. CRISIS CONTROL AND THE IMF
In my brief history lesson a few minutes ago, I explained how
the IMF was established to manage the par value system of fixed
exchange rates, and how that system collapsed in the early 1970s.
The IMF amended its charter in the late 1970s to reflect the new
circumstances, and for about five years, until 1982, the IMF was not
nearly as busy as it had been before. But then the debt crisis hit.69
You probably know the background to the debt crisis. It begins
with the oil crisis in the 1970s when the OPEC countries raised oil
prices. The money that flowed into the OPEC countries was depos-
ited in Western banks, mainly American banks, who used it to make
large loans to less developed countries, especially in Latin America.
Many of these had variable interest rates. The borrowing countries
were hit with a double whammy when interest rates rose and com-
modity prices fell. So in 1982 Mexico, and then Brazil, announced
that they were unable to service their debts. Enter the debt crisis.
The IMF rose to the occasion. It took the lead in moving the
world back from the brink of a meltdown of the world's economic
system. The IMF lent much bigger sums of money than it ever had
67. SeeJudy Shelton, Time for a New Bretton Woods, WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 1998, at
A22 (noting that "developing nations are opting to withdraw from the global
economy and abandon free-market capitalism"). For a reference to "global and
domestic 'attitudinal shifts' toward protectionism," see Gary G. Yerkey, Next Round
of WTO Services Talks Likely to be Difficult, EU Official Says, 16 INT'L TRADE REP. 235,
235 (1999).
68. See Yerkey et al., supra note 43, at 104 (noting legislative grounds for a
possible U.S. withdrawal from the WTO) and 112 (stating that "[tihe Asian eco-
nomic crisis and its legacy of burgeoning trade deficits and antidumping cases are
expected to stoke protectionist sentiments in Congress" and thereby frustrate ef-
forts at "fast track" negotiating authority for trade agreements); see also The Risks to
Free Trade, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1999, at 19 (noting that "protectionism is on the up
even in an American boom").
69. For a brief account of the debt crisis and its causes, see Head, supra note
18, at 597 n.19.
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before.7"
In a sense, then, the debt crisis of the early 1980s gave the IMF
a new lease on life. In the same sense, the Asian financial crisis did
the same thing. The bailouts arranged by the IMF in Thailand, In-
donesia, and Korea were by far the biggest to date. In the past two
years the IMF has solidified its position as the bailout king.
Is that a good thing? Do we want the IMF, or any institution,
providing bailouts to weak countries? Let me try to address that
question briefly in the final few minutes of my presentation.
A. The IMFs Performance in the Asian Crisis
In order to decide whether the IMF should have a bailout
function of the sort it has taken on most recently in Asia, perhaps
we should first evaluate how it performed there. The literature on
this issue is already quite rich and quite inconsistent. Some com-
mentators criticize the IMF harshly, saying it made serious mistakes
in handling the crisis. Indeed, a critical report emerged recently
71from the IMF's sister institution, the World Bank. Other com-
mentators identify particular shortcomings in the IMF's bailout
work but credit it, sometimes grudgingly, with having made the cri-
sis shorter and less severe than it might have been." The dis-
agreement among these commentators revolves mainly around the
question of whether IMF efforts to bolster confidence in the
economies of Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea to save them from
total meltdown caused more harm than good.
70. For a discussion of the IMF's huge increase in lending following the
emergence of the debt crisis, see Head, supra note 18, at 597-98.
71. See Sanger, supra note 45, at Al. For other views critical of the IMF, see
Robert Wade & Frank Veneroso, The Resources Lie Within, ECONOMIST, Nov. 7, 1998,
at 19, 20; Wade & Veneroso, supra note 65; Philip Bowring, Will Asia Get a Euro?,
TIME, Feb. 1, 1999, at 19 (referring to "the IMF's wrong-headed policies in Asia");
Jeffrey E. Garten, Lessons for the Next Financial Crisis, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999,
at 76, 82 (noting several specific criticisms).
72. See, e.g., Garten, supra note 71, at 81 (noting that many of the IMF's de-
fenders "say that it did the best it could with the information available at the time,
particularly given the fact that countries came to it late in the game and agreed to
its programs only well after the crisis became advanced"). A government minister
in Indonesia recently said the IMF had succeeded in its reform program in that
country. See IMF Program Has Succeeded in Indonesia: Economy Minister, ASIA PULSE,
Feb. 4, 1999, available in 1999 WL 5083786. For the IMF's self-criticism of its own
performance in the Asian financial crisis, see Timothy Lane et al., IMF-Supported
Programs in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand: A Preliminary Assessment (Jan. 1999)
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/op/opasia/
index.htrn>.
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My own view about the IMF's performance has two sides to it-
one positive and one negative. On the positive side, I return to the
"silver lining" point I made earlier: the IMF has insisted on impor-
tant financial sector reforms in the countries it helped bail out.
These reforms focused on strengthening central banks, imposing
international banking standards, and enforcing "exit policy" rules
against insolvent banks, for the good of depositors and the econ-
omy as a whole. As I mentioned earlier, I think these reforms are
good things.
On the other hand, I see two negative aspects of the IMF's per-
formance in Asia recently. Both of them relate to what is being re-
ferred to now as the "new international financial architecture."
That is my last topic, and I turn to it now.
B. A Nezw International Financial Architecture
It appears that the IMF has focused most of its attention so far
on the beach resorts and very little on the storms. By that, I mean
that the IMF has helped countries survive the immediate danger of
the Asian financial crisis and has required that they strengthen
their financial structures. But should the IMF also be focusing its
attention on the storm itself-that is, on preventing or at least pre-
dicting the external international economic shocks that devastated
Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea?
Yes and no. I doubt there is anything the IMF can do to prevent
the storms. There are too many players with too many interests
and too much money to be controlled by the IMF or anyone else.
In a typical day, $1.5 trillion in currency changes hands every day-13
about as much as total world trade for four months. It seems im-
possible to control the movement of so much money enough to
prevent economic shocks. But prediction might be possible. I think
the IMF failed in Asia to issue adequate warnings about the weak-
nesses and risks in Thailand, Indonesia, and Korea.
Some work is going on in that area now. A recent IMF re-
search paper identified a set of leading indicators for a banking cri-
sis, 74 and major economic powers recently pledged to strengthen
the "early warning system for financial crises." 75 Any meteorologist
73. See Kristof & Wyatt, supra note 1, at Al; Garten, supra note 71, at 76-77.
74. See In Asian Crisis, Macroeconomic Indicators Provided Limited Advance Warn-
ing, 27 IMIF SuRv. 259, 259 (1998).
75. Sanger, supra note 60, at A5.
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will tell you that predicting storms is a tricky business. The same is
true of economic storms. But surely it would be cost-effective for
the IMF to pour a lot more resources into that effort than it has in
the past.
The more important question mark in my mind about the
IMF's role in the Asian financial crisis centers on something that
has been called the "moral hazard" problem. The idea of "moral
hazard," in this context at least, is that bailing out governments,
even with big strings of conditionality attached to the bailout,
merely encourages governments to act imprudently in the future.
Look at the sequence of events: Thailand has a crisis, and the IMF
provides a bailout package; Indonesia has a crisis, and the IMF pro-
vides a bailout package; Korea has a crisis, and the IMF provides a
bailout package. What lesson will government leaders in other
countries learn from this? "If I have a crisis here, the IMF will pro-
vide a bailout package." Even if you believe, as I do, that the IMF's
bailout efforts had some good effects-financial sector reforms-
surely you would still have to acknowledge that there is an unfortu-
nate message being conveyed.
Many people have struggled with this "moral hazard" problem.
The way the IMF and the U.S. Treasury addressed it during the cri-
sis itself was like this: the risk that a total economic meltdown in
Asia might occur and might spread all around the world is so great76
as to outweigh the "moral hazard" concerns. Some commentators
have agreed with that judgment in the case of Asia but have said
that this should be the last time for bailouts.77 Others have down-
played the "moral hazard" issue, saying that the Asian bailouts do
76. See Fischer Presents IMF Perspective on Origins, Implications of Asian Crisis, 27
IMF SURV. 21, 22 (1998). Stanley Fischer, the First Deputy Managing Director of
the IMF, made the following comments when discussing the Asian crisis:
In effect, we face a trade-off. Faced with a crisis, we could allow it to
deepen and possibly teach international lenders a lesson in the process;
alternatively, we can step in to do what we can to mitigate the effects of
the crisis on the region and the world economy in a way that places some
of the burden on borrowers and lenders, although possibly with some
undesired side effects. The latter approach-doing what we can to miti-
gate the crisis-makes more sense.
Id.
77. See Martin Feldstein, Refocusing the IMP, FOREIGN ArF., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at
20, 30 (asserting that the IMF should "provide the guarantees needed to keep cur-
rent creditors engaged while swearing that it is the last time that such guarantees
will be provided").
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not encourage any reckless behavior, since governments usually
avoid going to the IMF at nearly all costs, and investors do in fact
lose a great deal of money when a crash comes like the one in
Asia."
This is a tough nut to crack. On the one hand, the risks of a
total meltdown of a major country-for example, Korea or Brazil-
is very troubling for the people who live there and for people in
other countries whose economies would suffer from such a melt-
down. How can the IMF stand by with its hands in its pockets and
watch such a country go down the drain? On the other hand, the
"moral hazard" of bailout after bailout does appear to be a losing
proposition in the long run.
This conundrum, this riddle, strikes me as one of the most im-
portant issues we face in the new century. Several commentators
have suggested partial solutions to it, and to other problems in the
existing global financial architecture. Some urge the establishment
of a special fund that the IMF would use to bail out countries that
had pre-qualified by meeting some requirements about banking
supervision, bankruptcy laws, transparent reporting, and the like.
If a country had not prequalified, the IMF bailout facility would
presumably be unavailable to it. But I question whether any set of
rules can be applied against countries that are considered "too big
to fail"-that is, too important for economic reasons or political
reasons or security reasons to let them collapse entirely.8s And if
the rules only apply to those countries that are below the top tier,
are the rules worth the effort?
The "moral hazard" question, and other problems that the
Asian financial crisis have highlighted so dramatically, have trig-
gered a landslide of proposals for reforming the international fi-
nancial system. The proposals focus on such matters as the need
for better division of labor among the various international finan-
cial institutions involved-the IMF, the World Bank, the Bank for
International Settlements, the Asian Development Bank, and so
on-the need for more and better information about financial
flows and policies, the need to establish effective bankruptcy and
78. See Fischer, supra note 43, at 27.
79. For a description of such a plan, as espoused by Mr. Fischer, see Frequency
of Global Crises Highlights Need to Consider International Lender of Last Resort, 28 IMF
SURV. 6, 6-8 (1999).
80. The bailout of Mexico in 1995, led by the United States, tended to "con-
vince[] investors that some countries were too strategically important to be al-
lowed to fail." Kristof & Sanger, supra note 4, at Al.
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other key financial laws in emerging markets, the need for those
countries to hold much larger foreign currency reserves, the need
for increased IMF resources, the need to abolish the IMF alto-
gether, and many, many more.8'
I predict we will see debate raging over these issues in the new
century. In a weird sort of way, maybe this is also a beneficial result
of the Asian financial crisis. Policymakers and lawmakers, includ-
ing our own Congress, really must study and evaluate carefully the
economic and legal foundations of our world, with an eye to guard-
ing against the sort of disaster that the Asian financial crisis has al-
ready brought and that its aftershocks threaten to continue bring-
ing for years to come.
I close, then, as I began, by saying that the Asian financial crisis
will have heavy implications far into the new century, in at least
three areas: a push for banking reform, a debate over economic in-
tegration in terms of currencies, trade, and investment, and a huge
challenge in finding a way to manage the economic typhoons that
will undoubtedly strike again.
81. For an array of critiques and proposals regarding the new global financial
architecture, see generally Garten, supra note 71; Martin Feldstein, A Self-Help
Guide for Emerging Markets, FOREIGN AFF., Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 93; and Time for a Re-
design?, ECONOMIST, Jan. 30, 1999, at 3, 4-5.
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